c0nc0rdance vs. Thunderf00t

[MrBogosity]

From what I understand, she wrote just like any other Russian novelist wrote, except she was writing in English she mostly learned from movies.  The result is her novels read like really bad movies.  I waded through Atlas Shrugged and The Fountainhead back in my early teens, and there's no way I could do that again. 

You did better than me. I only made it through 3 chapters of Fountainhead and 7 of Atlas.

[ArtemisVale]

You did better than me. I only made it through 3 chapters of Fountainhead and 7 of Atlas.

About the same for me.

[Professor_Fennec]

I really have no idea why Stefan Molyneux will just gush about her and her writing.  He doesn't do that about anyone else in any of his stuff that I've seen, and this is the guy who took Christopher Hitchens to task for his admiration of psychopath Che Guevara.  Of course, he also has demonstrated a complete lack of understanding of what fiction is, what it does, and how it works.

Because so much of Stefan Molyneux's identity is tied into Ayn Rand's philosophy, it seems reasonable that he would gush more over her writings than anybody else's. 

I actually have a lot of problems with Stefan Molyneux, mostly because his arguments and techniques are  based on rhetoric and strategies, and not so much on reason and evidence.  His franchise isn't about truth, so much as it has become about himself.  As much as he criticizes people for being sophists, he is himself a sophist, too, and much of his information about psychology is about 90 years out of date.  It also doesn't help that he's a climate change denyer and a logical positivist. 

Don't get me wrong, Stefan is great when it comes to theater and history.  These are his specialties, but like all specialists, he has a tendency to greatly overestimate his expertise in fields he is not an expert in.  That's where a lot of his problems come from, and it is really difficult for experts to explain to him his factual errors.  He doesn't want to listen, because his show is all about him, not about having a rational discussion to seek out truth as he so often claims. 

[Ibrahim90]

so what is a logical positivist again?

[Professor_Fennec]

Logical Positivism is based on verification.  Essentially, it means that a statement is only meaningful unless it can be proven true.  This is a self destructing idea, because you can't prove that only statements proven true are meaningful.  Also, it is really hard to prove anything true in any absolute sense.  This philosophy of science comes from the Vienna Circle, which dates back about 90 years or so. 

Logical Positivism was replaced by falsification.  Rather then try to verify everything, we attempt to falsify statements instead.  This is how contemporary science works, it is also why science only deals with falsifiable statements.  Statements that cannot be falsified are considered metaphysical, not scientific, and cannot be regarded as any basis for truth.  Metaphysics is about conceptualizing the possible.  Science is about rejecting what we know is false. 

[dallen68]

"a statement is only meaningful unless it can be proven true," errr...what? Does that mean I have to go about making false statements to say meaningful things?

[Professor_Fennec]

"a statement is only meaningful unless it can be proven true," errr...what? Does that mean I have to go about making false statements to say meaningful things?

No, in order to say something meaningful according to Logical Positivists, your statements must be already proven true. 

Under falsification, a statement is scientifically meaningful if it can be tested to be proven false. 

A logical positivist view of God would be to say that because we have no evidence for God, God is a meaningless word.  Thus, it can be said that God does not exist in the absolute sense.

Under falsification, the question of God's existence is not scientifically meaningful because you can't falsify the existence of God.  Though the statement "God exists" is not testable, it is still meaningful.  Thus, you can't truly say in any absolute sense that God does not exist.  However, you can use probability theory to say that the existence of God is extremely unlikely.  Given that our universe is fundamentally probabilistic, it makes more sense to view the universe in terms of probabilities, not absolutes. 

This is why you will often hear Richard Dawkins talk about God as an extremely improbable being, or how evolution is "climbing mount improbable". 

[BogosityForumUser]

No, in order to say something meaningful according to Logical Positivists, your statements must be already proven true. 

Under falsification, a statement is scientifically meaningful if it can be tested to be proven false. 

A logical positivist view of God would be to say that because we have no evidence for God, God is a meaningless word.  Thus, it can be said that God does not exist in the absolute sense.

Under falsification, the question of God's existence is not scientifically meaningful because you can't falsify the existence of God.  Though the statement "God exists" is not testable, it is still meaningful.  Thus, you can't truly say in any absolute sense that God does not exist.  However, you can use probability theory to say that the existence of God is extremely unlikely.  Given that our universe is fundamentally probabilistic, it makes more sense to view the universe in terms of probabilities, not absolutes. 

This is why you will often hear Richard Dawkins talk about God as an extremely improbable being, or how evolution is "climbing mount improbable". 

You are close but not quite right and need to be more accurate in your wording.  Before I explain, however, I'd like to point out that logical positivism is a huge collection of ideas with a few underlying tenants in common, resting on verification as the J in JTB=K.  For a real extensive, but still high level overview of it, I would recommend (rather, my colleague, with more knowledge in their specific arguments, recommended that I recommend) the "Vienna Circle" entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

First, you have to know what meaningful means.  It basically a measure of function or utility in a system.  Something that is cognitively meaningful means that it is sentence that conveys some sort of description of a subject (a proposition) that could be true or false; a statement.  This is different from things that are scientifically meaningful, which is a statement that explains some phenomenon; a hypothesis.  Basically, scientifically meaningful ⊂ cognitively meaningful ⊂  linguistically meaningful.

In LP, in order for something to be cognitively meaningful, it must be something that it is POSSIBLE to verify empirically or necessarily true (like logical statements, e.g. ~(A^~A)).   Therefore, sentences like "All ravens are black" and "Things either exist or they don't" are cognitively meaningful and "Eat your dinner!" is not (this also depends on your definition of POSSIBLE, which is one of many problems in LP theory as it tended to change on what they wanted done).  There are many other problems with LP as well, so it fell to the wayside; but needed a replacement, which Popper and others provided.

Under the falsification, for something to be scientifically meaningful, it must be POSSIBLE to generate an empirical counterexample.  Therefore, sentences like "all ravens are black" are scientific because you could come up with a real counter-example but "things either exist or they don't" and "Eat your dinner!" are not.  However, there are problems with falsification as well but most scientists don't concern themselves with them because it tends to only happen on edge cases.

Statements about God, to an LP, are not cognitively meaningful because they is not possible to verify empirically nor are they necessarily true.  One of the side effects of LP is the rise in theological noncognitivism.  As for falsification, because it is not possible to come up with an empirical counterexample, statements about god are not scientifically meaningful, but it doesn't say anything about whether they are cognitively meaningful.  Most people who are careful enough will admit that you cannot say anything about god with certainty (for complicated reasons I won't get in to now dealing with the supernatural); hence, Dawkins' hedging. 

This really only scratched the surface but Plato.stanford.edu is the place to go for more.  I cannot recommend it highly enough.  Also, feel free to ask if you'd like clarification.

[Professor_Fennec]

Thank you for your more expansive explanation, I'm sure you gave everybody a lot to think about. 

[dallen68]

Actually, the statement "Eat your dinner" is a command, not a statement of actuality, so it wouldn't fit here.

[MrBogosity]

Again, I feel I have to point out that only the Bayesians have it right here.

It seems to me that the positivists focus primarily on the Prior Probability (which, if anything, is the LEAST significant component since a sufficient string of LRs will cause people who start with wildly different priors to converge on the same posterior), while modern science (the frequentist approach) focuses primarily on the numerator of the LR. And it's pretty much assumed that if that number is sufficiently low (compared to what?) then the statement is falsified.

I call the numerator of the LR the "verification factor" and the denominator the "falsification factor." In Bayesian logic, a statement cannot be definitively falsified any more than it can be definitively confirmed. The verification and falsification factors show the relative strength of H₁ and H₀. Falsification is absolutely necessary to test a claim, but it doesn't have some exalted position over verification. The question is, how strongly does the evidence validate the hypothesis compared to how strongly it falsifies it. You cannot simply say that a low verification factor is falsification, because the falsification factor may be even lower!

The bottom line is, a hypothesis where p(H)=.00001 is precisely as likely to be confirmed as one where p(H)=.99999 is to be falsified. Pretty much by definition.

[BogosityForumUser]

Actually, the statement "Eat your dinner" is a command, not a statement of actuality, so it wouldn't fit here.

You are right.  I meant to use the word "sentence" to illustrated the different sets each belongs to.  They are all sentences because they are all linguistically meaningful.  I have edited the post to reflect that.

I'd also like to apologize.  I came down on someone for incorrect wording and then do the same myself.  Guess that is why they always tell you to have someone else proofread your work.

As for Bayesian vs positivists, they are actually working on two different problems.  Bayesian theory is used in the field of corroboration or confirmation (depending on your school of thought).  That is, it lends more power to hypotheses (or statements and hypotheses, again depending on your school of thought).  You have to already have a statement or hypothesis before you can use Bayes Theorem.  Positivists are concerned with identifying cognitively meaningful statements to begin with.  In fact, it is possible to be both at once, with enough intellectual contortions; however, most (all?) Bayesian are not as modern Bayesian theory tends to use more modern techniques to identify cognitively meaningful statements.

[Travis Retriever]

Again, I feel I have to point out that only the Bayesians have it right here.

It seems to me that the positivists focus primarily on the Prior Probability (which, if anything, is the LEAST significant component since a sufficient string of LRs will cause people who start with wildly different priors to converge on the same posterior), while modern science (the frequentist approach) focuses primarily on the numerator of the LR. And it's pretty much assumed that if that number is sufficiently low (compared to what?) then the statement is falsified.

I call the numerator of the LR the "verification factor" and the denominator the "falsification factor." In Bayesian logic, a statement cannot be definitively falsified any more than it can be definitively confirmed. The verification and falsification factors show the relative strength of H₁ and H₀. Falsification is absolutely necessary to test a claim, but it doesn't have some exalted position over verification. The question is, how strongly does the evidence validate the hypothesis compared to how strongly it falsifies it. You cannot simply say that a low verification factor is falsification, because the falsification factor may be even lower!

The bottom line is, a hypothesis where p(H)=.00001 is precisely as likely to be confirmed as one where p(H)=.99999 is to be falsified. Pretty much by definition.

Such is the reality of living in a probabilistic world.   It seems that the human brain just isn't good at handling probability.  As you yourself have said.

[MrBogosity]

As for Bayesian vs positivists, they are actually working on two different problems.  Bayesian theory is used in the field of corroboration or confirmation (depending on your school of thought).  That is, it lends more power to hypotheses (or statements and hypotheses, again depending on your school of thought).  You have to already have a statement or hypothesis before you can use Bayes Theorem.  Positivists are concerned with identifying cognitively meaningful statements to begin with.  In fact, it is possible to be both at once, with enough intellectual contortions; however, most (all?) Bayesian are not as modern Bayesian theory tends to use more modern techniques to identify cognitively meaningful statements.

Actually, that's just not true. One of the reasons for the Prior Probability is to make sure you're going through the process of having a meaningful statement that you can estimate the probability of to begin with. And really (because of what I said above of a chain of LRs causing wildly different priors to converge on the same posterior), the actual number you come up with for the prior, at least in the context of an inference as opposed to, say, a medical diagnosis, is less important than the fact that you asked the questions that enabled you to come up with that number to begin with.

Phlogiston, for example, was a meaningless hypothesis because the p(H) ended up being 1. Which is why that isn't allowed: if there's no possible LR that can drop your prior, then the conclusion is assumed and locked before you begin. Same if you blindly consider something impossible and consider it to have a p(H) of 0. Coming up with the prior means going through the process of evaluating the claim to make sure there's at least a chance that it could go either way.

[BogosityForumUser]

Actually, that's just not true. One of the reasons for the Prior Probability is to make sure you're going through the process of having a meaningful statement that you can estimate the probability of to begin with. And really (because of what I said above of a chain of LRs causing wildly different priors to converge on the same posterior), the actual number you come up with for the prior, at least in the context of an inference as opposed to, say, a medical diagnosis, is less important than the fact that you asked the questions that enabled you to come up with that number to begin with.

Phlogiston, for example, was a meaningless hypothesis because the p(H) ended up being 1. Which is why that isn't allowed: if there's no possible LR that can drop your prior, then the conclusion is assumed and locked before you begin. Same if you blindly consider something impossible and consider it to have a p(H) of 0. Coming up with the prior means going through the process of evaluating the claim to make sure there's at least a chance that it could go either way.

Your blanket assertion of falsity makes it a little hard to respond as I am unsure which premise you deny.  Perhaps if you expounded a little that might help.  But as it stands I don't see what you disagree with because Bayesian theory itself doesn't say if the statement is "meaningful" (and it what sense you mean I don't understand, e.g. scientific, cognitively, etc.).  Instead, it seems you use other theories (falsification?) to say whether the hypothesis is acceptable or not.

But it is possible to be a Bayesian and a logical positivist.  For example, the resurrection, so to speak, of Bayes can be traced back to Rudolf Carnap.  He was also one of the major players in the Vienna Circle.  The problem, like I mentioned earlier, it that he had to do some major contortions to get both to work simultaneously.